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Craig D. Bell *
Michael H. Brady **
INTRODUCTION
This Article reviews significant recent developments in the laws
affecting Virginia state and local taxation. Its Parts cover legislative activity, judicial decisions, and selected opinions and other
pronouncements from the Virginia Department of Taxation (the
“Tax Department” or “Department of Taxation”) and the Attorney
General of Virginia over the past year.
Part I of this Article addresses state taxes. Part II covers local
taxes, including real and tangible personal property taxes, license
taxes, recordation taxes, and administrative local tax procedures.
The overall purpose of this Article is to provide Virginia tax and
general practitioners with a concise overview of the recent developments in Virginia taxation that are most likely to impact their
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clients. However, it does not address many of the numerous minor,
locality-specific, or technical legislative changes to Title 58.1 of the
Virginia Code, which covers taxation.
I. TAXES ADMINISTERED BY THE TAX DEPARTMENT
A. Significant Legislative Activity
1. Income Taxation
a. Conformity to the Internal Revenue Code
Consistent with long-standing practice, the General Assembly in
2020 amended section 58.1-301 of the Virginia Code of 1950 (the
“Virginia Code”), which mandates conformity with the Internal
Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) as of a certain date, and moved the date
from December 31, 2018 to December 31, 2019.1 Although advancing the date of conformity, Senate Bill 582 and House Bill 1413 left
unchanged the previously adopted exceptions from the rule of conformity that are codified at section 58.1-301(B)(1)–(5).2
The General Assembly also deconformed from another I.R.C.
provision, adopted in 2019, that was “related to the reduction in
the medical expense deduction floor.”3 A congressional appropriations act adopted on December 20, 2019 reduced the percentage of
adjusted gross income that had to be spent on qualifying medical
expenses to obtain a deduction, from 10% to 7.5%, a reduction applicable to tax years 2019 and 2020.4 The Department of Taxation
projected that this decision to deconform would “preserve revenues
of $39.7 million in Fiscal Year 2020 and $14.0 million in Fiscal
Year 2021.”5

1. Acts of Feb. 17 & Mar. 10, 2020, chs. 1 & 255, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified
as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-301 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
2. Id. at __, __.
3. Id. at __, __.
4. Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, § 103, 133 Stat.
2534, 3228 (2019).
5. DEP’T OF TAXATION, 2020 FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 582, at 2, https://lis.virg
inia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+oth+SB582FER161+PDF [http://perma.cc/N6R5-HAL6].
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Senate Bill 582 became effective immediately, on February 17,
2020,6 and applies to tax years 2018 and beyond.7 In total, the Tax
Department projected that advancement of conformity would reduce Virginia tax revenues by approximately $17.5 million in fiscal
year 2020, and $4.7 million in fiscal year 2021, but increase revenues thereafter.8
b. Updated Procedures for Reporting Federal Adjustments to
Partnership Taxable Income
On November 2, 2015, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget
Act of 2015 (“BBA”), which adopted a new federally authorized
partnership audit regime for most partnerships and became effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017.9 Under
the BBA, partnerships are subject to either partner-level audits (if
the partnership is able to elect out of the BBA procedures and
makes an affirmative decision to do so) or the BBA procedures.10
The BBA procedures generally apply beginning with 2018 returns.
The BBA procedures fundamentally change the manner in
which the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) will determine, assess,
and collect partnership adjustments. Pursuant to these new procedures, the IRS generally will make adjustments, determine an imputed tax (the “imputed underpayment”), and assess and collect
tax (including penalties and interest) at the partnership entity
level.11 There are limited options to elect out of the BBA procedures
(election out)12 or elect to have the reviewed year partners assessed
instead of the partnership (the “push-out” election).13

6. Ch. 1, 2020 Va. Acts at __.
7. Id. at __.
8. See DEP’T OF TAXATION, supra note 5, at 2.
9. Pub. L. No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584 (2015) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221–
6235 (2015)). Note that the 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act made several corrections
and clarifications to the 2015 BBA, effective as if originally included in the BBA. Pub. L.
No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015). Additionally, on March 23, 2018, the Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2018 made a number of significant and retroactive amendments to the BBA,
including clarification of its scope, determination and modification of imputed under payments, rules pertaining to tiered partnerships, and consequences for a partnership’s failure
to pay an imputed underpayment. Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348.
10. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221–6235 (U.S.C. Title 26 is the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended).
11. Id. § 6221(a).
12. Id. § 6221(b).
13. Id. § 6226(a).
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Under the BBA and subject to certain exceptions, the IRS will
audit partnership items at the partnership level and issue a proposed adjustment to the partnership for the reviewed year.14 For
270 days, the reviewed year partners may file amended returns
and pay their share of the tax (the “pay-up” method), and/or the
partnership may submit modifications to the imputed underpayment.15 After that period, the IRS issues a notice of final partnership audit adjustment. The partnership then has forty-five days to
elect whether the partnership will use a push-out or partnership
pays method.16 Under the push-out method, the partnership allocates the adjustments to the reviewed year partners to pay the tax
on their current year (adjustment year) returns.17 Under the partnership pays method, the partnership pays the tax on its adjustment year return, causing the current year partners to effectively
bear the liability.18 These practices create complexity at the state
level because partners and apportionment data may be different in
the reviewed year and the adjustment year.
All of the foregoing led most states to ponder next steps. The
2020 General Assembly responded by amending Virginia Code sections 58.1-311, -499, and -1823 and enacting new section 58.1311.2 and new sections 58.1-396 through -399.7. Cumulatively,
these provisions establish the procedures for reporting federal adjustments to taxable income.19 The General Assembly adopted the
following key provisions for the reporting and payment of tax on
final adjustments to the federal taxable income of partnerships and
their partners.
Virginia Partnership Representative. The federal partnership
representative will serve as the Virginia partnership representative unless the partnership designates another person as its state
partnership representative.20 Such designation must be in writing.21 The legislation requires the Department of Taxation to establish reasonable qualifications and procedures for designating a
14. Id. §§ 6225, 6231(b).
15. Id. § 6225(c).
16. Id. § 6226(a).
17. Id. § 6226(b).
18. Id. § 6227.
19. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1030, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 58.1-311, -311.2, -396, -397, -398, -399, -399.1, -399.2, -399.3, - 399.4, -399.5, -399.6,
-399.7, -499, -1823 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-398(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
21. Id.
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person, other than a federal partnership representative, to be the
Virginia partnership representative.22
Final Determination Date. The partnership’s final determination shall occur when all adjustments made by the IRS to the federal taxable income of a partnership have become final and all appeal rights under the I.R.C. are exhausted or have been waived for
the partnership’s taxable year.23 If the taxpayer was a member of
a combined or consolidated group, the final determination triggering these reporting obligations shall be the first day on which no
adjustments remain to be finally determined for the entire group.24
Reporting and Payment Requirements for a Partnership Subject
to a Final Federal Adjustment. The Virginia partnership representative shall be provided at least ninety days from the partnership’s final determination date to (1) file a completed federal adjustments report with the Department of Taxation; (2) notify its
direct partners of their distributive share of the adjustments; and
(3) file amended composite and/or withholding returns for direct
nonresident partners as required by state law, and pay any additional Virginia tax, interest, and penalties for such nonresident
partners.25 Direct partners shall, no later than one year after the
final determination date, file a federal adjustments report that
identifies the distributive share of adjustments reported to such
direct partner, and pay any additional amount of tax, penalty, and
interest due.26
Partnership Pays Election. Virginia Code section 58.1-399.1 provides that an audited partnership may make an elective payment
through its state partnership representative to pay the tax, interest, and penalties in lieu of such amounts its direct and indirect
partners owe (the “partnership pays election”).27 Partnerships
making the election have up to ninety days from the partnership’s
final determination date to (1) notify the Department of Taxation
it is making the election and (2) file a federal adjustments report
with the Department of Taxation.28 The partnership will then have
up to one year from the partnership’s final determination date to
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. § 58.1-398(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-311.2(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-311.2(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-399(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-399(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-399.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-399.1(A)(1)–(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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make the payment in lieu of amounts owed by its direct and indirect partners.29 The partnership pays election shall be the amount
of the federal adjustments, subject to the following modifications.
(1) Direct Exempt Partners. The distributive share of adjustments attributable to direct exempt partners not subject to tax on
such income shall be excluded from the calculation.30
(2) Direct Corporate Partners and Direct Exempt Partners. The
distributive share of adjustments attributable to direct corporate
partners and direct exempt partners subject to tax on such income
(e.g., unrelated business income) shall be apportioned or allocated
to Virginia using Virginia’s existing apportionment factors pursuant to sections 58.1-405 through -423 of the Virginia Code and shall
be subject to tax at the tax rate specified in Virginia Code section
58.1-400.31
(3) Nonresident Direct Partners. The distributive share of adjustments attributable to nonresident direct partners subject to tax
as individuals or trusts shall be sourced to Virginia using Virginia’s nonresident partner sourcing laws and regulations and
shall be subject to tax at the tax rate specified in Virginia Code
section 58.1-320.32
(4) Tiered Partners. The distributive share of adjustments attributable to tiered partners (partners that are pass-through entities themselves) shall be subject to tax according to the type of underlying income.
Income that would be sourced to Virginia if ultimately attributable to nonresident partners (e.g., business income) shall be
sourced to Virginia using the sourcing rules attributable to such
income.33
Income that would be sourced to Virginia if attributable to nonresident partners (e.g., investment income) shall be sourced to Virginia and shall be subject to tax at the highest rate applicable to
individuals and trusts, except to the extent the partnership can

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. § 58.1-399.1(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-399.1(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-399.1(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-399.1(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-399.1(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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demonstrate the adjustment is attributable to nonresident indirect
partners or partners not subject to tax on such income.34
The partnership pays election shall be irrevocable unless the
Virginia Department of Taxation determines otherwise. Direct and
indirect partners cannot claim deductions, credits, or refunds of
amounts paid by the partnership to Virginia; however, resident direct partners may claim a credit for amounts paid by the partnership or tiered partner on the resident partner’s behalf to another
state.35
Tiered Partners. Tiered partners are subject to the above reporting and payment requirements and may use the default reporting
method or the partnership pays election at each tier. Tiered partners and their partners must make all reports and payments
within ninety days following the time for filing and furnishing
statements to tiered partners under I.R.C. section 6226. The Department of Taxation may promulgate regulations to establish procedures and deadlines for reports and payments required by tiered
partners and their partners.36
Modified Reporting and Payment. The Department of Taxation
and tiered partners may enter into agreements to use alternative
reporting and payment methods if the partnership or tiered partner can demonstrate the requested method will reasonably provide
for the reporting and payment of taxes, penalties, and interest
due.37
De Minimis Exceptions. Virginia may establish a de minimis
amount upon which taxpayers shall not be required to comply with
the new aforementioned reporting and payment obligations.38
If a partnership or partner makes a partnership pays election or
alternative reporting and payment method pursuant to Virginia
Code sections 58.1-399.1 or -399.3, respectively, such election is not
revocable by such partnership or partner. However, the Depart-

34. Id.
35. Id. § 58.1-399.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
36. Id. § 58.1-399.2(A)–(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
37. Id. § 58.1-399.3 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
38. Id. § 58.1-399.6 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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ment of Taxation may make a discretionary determination that allows such election to be revoked.39 These new procedures for reporting federal adjustments to partnership taxable income took effect on July 1, 2020.
c. Tax Deduction and Subtraction for Employer-Paid
Commuting Expenses
Under federal tax law, employers can provide their employees
tax-free cash reimbursements if they are “qualified transportation
fringe” benefits.40 The cost of transit passes, carpooling arrangements, and qualified parking may be reimbursed up to a certain
amount, which is determined annually by IRS regulations.41 However, the 2017 Tax Act disallowed the employers’ deduction against
corporate taxable income for providing those same qualified transportation fringe benefits.42 Having conformed to the 2017 Tax Act
in 2019, the Commonwealth presently gives this expenditure the
same income tax treatment as the federal government.43
In 2020, the General Assembly directed the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation to “study the utilization
and impacts of commuter tax benefit tax deductions for businesses
in Virginia and report . . . by December 2020” on the results of that
study.44 This direction is the prelude to the potential effectiveness
of an individual income tax deduction, and of a corporate income
tax subtraction, of the amount of “commuter benefits provided by
an employer . . . to an employee.”45 Note that chapter 1033 of the
2020 Virginia Acts of Assembly expressly provides that “the provisions of this act shall not become effective unless reenacted by the
2021 Session of the Virginia General Assembly.”46

39. Id. § 58.1-399.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
40. See 26 U.S.C. § 132(a)(5).
41. See id. § 132(f).
42. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13304, 131 Stat. 2054, 2125
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 274(a)(4)).
43. Act of Feb. 15, 2019, ch. 18, 2019 Va. Acts 31, 31 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-301(B) (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
44. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1033, 2020 Va. Acts __, __.
45. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-322.03(17), -402(C)(28)
(Cum. Supp. 2020)).
46. Id. at __.
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If the provisions of chapter 1033 are reenacted in 2021, “commuter benefits” will be defined as “expenses paid for public transportation, as defined in § 33.2-100, and ridesharing arrangements,
as defined in § 46.2-1400, for the purposes of commuting to and
from the employer.”47 In the case of reenactment, the amount of
commuter benefits that may be deducted by an employee’s individual Virginia adjusted gross income, and that may be paid and
claimed as a deduction by the employer from its Virginia taxable
income, will be limited to $265 per employee.48
d. Grants Available from Virginia Outdoors Foundation for
Transfers of Fee Simple Interests in Land for Conservation
Purposes
Current law authorizes individuals and corporations to receive
credits against individual and corporate income tax liability for
qualified donations of interests in land to “a public or private conservation agency eligible to hold such land and interests therein
for conservation or preservation purposes,” including the Virginia
Outdoors Foundation (“VOF”).49 These qualified donations may
take the form of a fee simple interest in the land or, more commonly, a conservation easement.50
Besides receiving donations of interests in land, the VOF has
also been empowered to administer the Open-Space Lands Preservation Trust Fund and, since 1997, to give grants “to persons conveying conservation easements” to the VOF in accordance with the
Open-Space Land Act and Virginia Conservation Easement Act.51
House Bill 1622 amended Virginia Code section 10.1-1801 to expand the interests of land for which grants may be given to include

47. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-322.03(17), -402(C)(28)
(Cum. Supp. 2020)).
48. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-322.03 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-512(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2017); see, e.g., Woolford v. Va. Dep’t of
Taxation, 294 Va. 377, 382, 806 S.E.2d 398, 400 (2017). The Virginia Outdoors Foundation
was established in 1966 “to promote the [preservation of open-space lands] and to encourage
private gifts of money, securities, land, or other property of whatever character for the purpose of preserving the natural, scenic, historic, scientific, and recreational areas of the
State.” Act of Apr. 5, 1966, ch. 525, 1966 Va. Acts 703, 704 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 10.1-1800 to -1804 (Repl. Vol. 2018)).
50. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-512(C)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
51. Act of Mar. 13,1997, ch. 338, 1997 Va. Acts 482, 483 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 10.1-1801.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2018)).
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“fee simple title or other rights, interests, or privileges in property.”52 This expansion of grant-making authority applies whether
the grant is going to a locality who is acquiring the interest or to a
person conveying the interest to the VOF.53 As before, however,
“[t]o be eligible for a grant award, the property interest shall be
compliant with the Open-Space Land Act.”54
e. Student Loan Debt Cancellation/Discharge Excluded from
Adjusted Gross Income
The 2017 Tax Act provided that gross income does not include
the post-2017 discharge of a student loan or private education “on
account of the death or total and permanent disability of the student.”55 By conforming to the I.R.C. as amended through 2018
(with certain limited exceptions),56 Virginia already excluded such
discharges on account of total and permanent disability from Virginia gross income.
Perhaps for the avoidance of doubt, in 2020 the General Assembly expressly provided that such discharges in favor of “a veteran
who has been rated by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, or
its successor agency pursuant to federal law, to have a 100 percent
service-connected, permanent, and total disability” would not
count as Virginia adjusted gross income for said “eligible veteran.”57 This provision applies to tax years 2020 through 2025,58
paralleling the provisions of the 2017 Tax Act.59

52. Act of Mar. 31, 2020, ch. 567, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1801.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
53. Id. at __.
54. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1801.1(D) (Cum. Supp.
2020)); see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1700 to -1705 (Repl. Vol. 2018).
55. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11031, 131 Stat. 2054, 2081
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 108(f)(5)(A)–(B)).
56. Act of Feb. 15, 2019, ch. 18, 2019 Va. Acts 31, 31 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-301(B) (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
57. Act of Apr. 2, 2020, ch. 606, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-321(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
58. Id. at __.
59. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act § 11031, 131 Stat. at 2081.
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2. Sales and Use Taxation
Unlike the session in 2019, which saw sweeping changes to the
sales and use tax regime of the Commonwealth,60 the 2020 sessions
of the General Assembly brought about very few alterations.
a. Sales and Use Tax Exemption for Gun Safes
In keeping with the new legislative majority’s interest in gun
legislation, the General Assembly passed a new exemption from
imposition of either state or local sales and use taxation on the purchase of certain gun safes.61 To enjoy the exemption provided by
chapters 191 and 507 of the 2020 Virginia Acts of Assembly, the
gun safe must (1) have a “selling price of $1,500 or less”; (2) be a
safe or vault that is “(i) commercially available, (ii) secured with a
digital or dial combination locking mechanism or biometric locking
mechanism, and (iii) designed for the storage of a firearm or of ammunition for use in a firearm”; and (3) not be a “glass-faced cabinet.”62 Although the bills cut taxes and addressed gun ownership,
two highly contentious issues in the 2020 Session, the final agreed
legislation passed with only token opposition.63
b. Sales and Use Exemption for Film Production and
Distribution Extended
Virginia Code section 58.1-609.6 provides a partial mediarelated exemption from sales and use taxation for the “lease,
rental, license, sale, other transfer, or use” of audiovisual work by
one acquiring the work to exhibit it to others or otherwise interact
with it artistically.64 In essence, this is an exemption from sales
and use tax for intellectual property rights in audiovisual media.

60. See Craig D. Bell & Michael H. Brady, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation,
54 U. RICH. L. REV. 133, 134–41 (2019).
61. See Acts of Mar. 6 & 27, 2020, chs. 191 & 507, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified
as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.10(21) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
62. Id. at __, __.
63. See SB 268 Retail Sales and Use Tax; Exemption for Certain Gun Sales, VA.’S LEGIS.
INFO. SYS., https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+sum+SB268 [https://perma.cc/
2MXQ-YN9F]; HB 888 Retail Sales and Use Tax; Exemption for Certain Gun Sales, VA.’S
LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+sum+HB888&201+sum
+HB888 [https://perma.cc/9HBZ-XD8B].
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.6(6)(a)(i)–(iii) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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The exemption is partial because certain tangible personal property transferred with the intellectual property remains subject to
tax “to the extent of the value of their tangible components prior to
their use in the production of any audiovisual work and prior to
their enhancement by any production service.”65
This exemption was set to expire on July 1, 2022.66 In adopting
House Bill 1318, this partial exemption was extended through July
1, 2027.67
3. Tax Credits and Exemptions
a. Green Job Creation Tax Credit Extended
Existing Virginia law provides an individual and corporate income tax credit “for each new green job created within the Commonwealth by the taxpayer.”68 This tax credit, in the amount of
$500 “for each new green job” whose “annual salary . . . is $50,000
or more,” was set to expire at the end of 2020.69 In passing House
Bill 408, the General Assembly extended the sunset date of this tax
credit through the 2024 tax year.70
b. Motion Picture Production Tax Credit Extended
A host of subsidies and incentives are provided for filming movies in the Commonwealth.71 Among these are a refundable credit
against individual and corporate income tax liability, which is
available to “any motion picture production company with qualifying expenses of at least $250,000 with respect to a motion picture
production filmed in Virginia.”72 The amount of the refundable

65. Id. § 58.1-609.6(6)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
66. Id. § 58.1-609.6(6) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
67. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 966, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-609.6(6) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:05(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
69. Id. § 58.1-439.12:05(A) (Cum. Supp. 2019).
70. Act of Mar. 23, 2020, ch. 429, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-439.12:05 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
71. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2320 (Repl. Vol. 2017) (establishing the “Governor’s
Motion Picture Opportunity Fund (the Fund) to be used, in the sole discretion of the Governor, to support the film and video industries in Virginia by providing the means for attracting production companies and producers who make their projects in the Commonwealth
using Virginia employees, goods and services”).
72. Id. § 58.1-439.12:03(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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credit is limited to “15 percent of the production company’s qualifying expenses or 20 percent of such expenses if the production is
filmed in an economically distressed area of the Commonwealth.”73
Additional refundable credit amounts may be claimed, in certain
circumstances, for employing Virginia residents in connection with
a production.74 Under the previous law, these refundable credits
could apply to expenditures through 2021,75 and were administered by the Virginia Film Office and the Tax Department.76
In adopting House Bill 1318 and its twin in the Senate, Senate
Bill 923, the General Assembly in 2020 extended the availability
of these refundable credits through 2026.77 It also transferred the
responsibilities of the Virginia Film Office to the Virginia Tourism
Authority78 and revised certain aspects of the credits’ administration.79 Among these changes was permitting the Tax Department
to issue tax credits that could be claimed in future years, albeit
without interest.80
c. Certification of Pollution Control Equipment Used by Political
Subdivisions
As permitted by article X, section 6(d) of the Virginia Constitution, “[c]ertified pollution control equipment and facilities” are exempt from state and local taxation.81 To enjoy this exemption, “the
state certifying authority having jurisdiction with respect to such
property” was required to “certif[y] to the Department of Taxation”
that the equipment or facilities were “constructed, reconstructed,
erected, or acquired in conformity with the state program or requirements for abatement or control of water or atmospheric pollution or contamination.”82 Note the past tense.

73. Id.; see id. § 58.1-439.12:03(A)(1)–(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020) (defining qualifying expenses).
74. Id. § 58.1-439.12:03(B)(1)–(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
75. Id. § 58.1-439.12:03(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
76. Id. § 58.1-439.12:03(D)(1)–(3), (E), (H) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
77. Acts of Apr. 9, 2020, chs. 966 & 967, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:03(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
78. Id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:03(D)(1)–(4), (E),
(H) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
79. Id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439.12:03(D)(3), (5) (Cum.
Supp. 2020)).
80. Id. at __, __.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
82. Id. § 58.1-3660(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020). Which Virginia (or interstate) agency serves
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The General Assembly, in adopting Senate Bill 685 and House
Bill 1173, provided that “the state certifying authority having jurisdiction” may make a prospective certification, that is, one prior
to construction, reconstruction, erection, or acquisition.83 However,
this power, and the certainty it affords, may be exercised only as
to “equipment, facilities, devices, or other property” that is “intended for use by any political subdivision in conjunction with the
operation of its water, wastewater, stormwater, or solid waste
management facilities or systems.”84
4. Tax Enforcement
a. Tax Department Deputized to Investigate “Misclassification”
of Employees
Among the most divisive legislation that passed the General Assembly in 2020 was House Bill 1407, which adopted the rule that
when “an individual performs services for an employer for remuneration, that individual shall be considered an employee of the
party that pays that remuneration unless such individual or his
employer demonstrates that such individual is an independent
contractor.”85
An employer who “fails to properly classify an individual as an
employee” and who “fails to pay taxes, benefits, or other contributions required to be paid with respect to an employee” may be subject to a civil penalty,86 and debarred from contracting with public
bodies and “covered institutions.”87
The legislation merits mention here because the General Assembly charged the Tax Department with the duty of enforcing this
legislation. “The Department shall determine whether an individual is an independent contractor by applying Internal Revenue
Service guidelines,” enforce the civil penalties, notify of debarment,
as the certifying authority depends upon the nature of the pollution being controlled. See id.
83. Acts of Mar. 2 & 10, 2020, chs. 65 & 252, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
84. Id. at __, __.
85. Act of Apr. 6, 2020, ch. 681, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.11900 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
86. Id. at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1901 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
87. Id. at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1902(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)). Covered
institutions are defined as certain “public institution[s] of higher education.” VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.2-4321(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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and “report annually on its enforcement of this chapter to the Governor and the General Assembly regarding compliance with and
enforcement of” new chapter 19 of Title 58.1.88 Various Virginia
agencies are authorized to assist the Tax Department in enforcing
this legislation, including by sharing confidential taxpayer information “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of § 58.1-3.”89 The Tax
Department is also obligated to develop guidelines implementing
House Bill 1407.90
The legislation expressly revised sections 58.1-1821 and -1825 to
provide that the Tax Department’s enforcement of the debarment
provisions may be administratively appealed,91 or subject to judicial review.92 No specific provision was adopted with respect to any
civil penalties imposed.
Governor Northam proposed, and the General Assembly agreed,
to delay the effect of chapter 681 until January 1, 2021.93 The cost
of this legislation on the Tax Department alone is expected to exceed $600,000 for fiscal year 2021, and $800,000 in fiscal year 2022,
with a positive revenue impact of $1.7 million in fiscal year 2021
and $2.6 million in fiscal year 2022.94
B. Significant Judicial Decision
1. Virginia Court Dismisses Massachusetts Online Sales Tax
Case—Crutchfield Corp. v. Harding
In this case, the Albemarle County Circuit Court dismissed a
case brought by a Virginia taxpayer challenging the applicability
of Massachusetts’ 2017 remote seller nexus standards for sales and
use tax purposes.95 The judge found a lack of jurisdiction based on
the absence of sufficient contact by Massachusetts.96

88. Ch. 681, 2020 Va. Acts at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-1900 to -1902, -1905)
(Cum. Supp. 2020)).
89. Id. at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3.4 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
90. Id. at __.
91. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1821 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
92. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1825(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
93. Id. at __.
94. DEP’T OF TAXATION, 2020 FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, H.B. 1407, at 2, https://lis.virg
inia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+oth+HB1407FER161+PDF
[https://perma.cc/RX7Q-MJ
E8].
95. Crutchfield Corp. v. Harding, 103 Va. Cir. 211 (2019) (Albemarle County).
96. Id.
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On April 3, 2017, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue
(“MDOR”) issued a directive advising taxpayers that it had
adopted an administrative bright-line rule that would require outof-state internet vendors to collect sales or use tax if they met certain sales and transaction thresholds.97 Under the rule, which was
to become effective July 1, 2017, an internet vendor with a principal place of business located outside of Massachusetts was required to register, collect and remit sales or use tax on its Massachusetts sales if, during the preceding year, it had over $500,000
in Massachusetts sales for delivery into Massachusetts in at least
100 transactions.98 On June 2, 2017, MDOR sent an informational
letter to Crutchfield Corp. (“Crutchfield”) advising the company of
the new directive.99
On June 28, 2017, MDOR issued a second directive, Directive
17-2, that revoked Directive 17-1 while giving notice of its intent
to propose regulations similar to the contents of Directive 17-1 on
internet vendor sales and use tax nexus issues.100 About three
months later, MDOR adopted a regulation that required out-ofstate internet vendors to collect sales or use tax if they meet certain
sales and transaction thresholds that mirrored those contained in
the recently revoked Directive 17-1.101
Between June 2, 2017 and October 20, 2017, MDOR sent three
letters to Crutchfield first advising it of the initial Directive 17-1,
a second letter advising Crutchfield of the new regulation, and finally a third letter advising Crutchfield to review its Massachusetts sales as it may have a duty to collect and remit Massachusetts
sales and use tax.102 Upon receipt of the third letter, Crutchfield
initiated this litigation seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Massachusetts law imposing sales and use tax collections on remote sellers such as Crutchfield was invalid under the Commerce
97. MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, DIRECTIVE 2017-1 (2017) (revoked and superseded by
MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, DIRECTIVE 2017-2 (2017)), https://www.mass.gov/directive/direct
ive-17-1-requirement-that-out-of-state-internet-vendors-with-significant [https://perma.cc
/5KA7-K4MM].
98. Id.
99. Affidavit of Dale Morrow at 2–3, Exhibit A to Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of His Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction, Harding, 103 Va. Cir. 211 (No. CL17001145-00).
100. MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, Directive 2017-2 (2017), https://www.mass.gov/directive
/directive-17-2-revocation-of-directive-17-1-in-anticipation-of-a-proposed-regulation [https:
//perma.cc/UJ4S-6HM4].
101. 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 64 H.1.7 (2017).
102. Harding, 103 Va. Cir. at 211.
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Clause, violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act (“ITFA”), and that
it could bring the action in Virginia pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-184.1(A) and (C)—declaratory judgment to adjudicate
constitutional nexus.103 MDOR responded with a motion to dismiss
the Crutchfield complaint because the Virginia court lacked jurisdiction.104
In support of its motion to dismiss, MDOR asserted that the only
contacts it had with Virginia related to Crutchfield were the three
informational letters MDOR sent to Crutchfield and other vendors.105 MDOR stated that its Commissioner was “simply trying to
carry out his own State’s laws” and, in doing so, had sent informational communications to entities located in other states making
sales to residents of Massachusetts.106 MDOR asserted these letters did not constitute or satisfy Virginia’s jurisdiction requirements because, as applied to Massachusetts in this case, personal
jurisdiction was lacking under the Constitution of the United
States due to the lack of minimum contacts with Virginia.107
Crutchfield contended that MDOR was active in its pursuit of
business non-filers located in Virginia. Specifically, Crutchfield argued that in over four and a half months between June 2017 to late
October 2017, MDOR sent seventeen separate demand letters to
Virginia businesses (three letters to each of five different companies, including Crutchfield, and two letters to a sixth company).108
Crutchfield also asserted that MDOR conducted sixty-seven audits
in Virginia, spending hundreds of days and more than 4000 hours
in Virginia between 2010 and the beginning of 2017.109 During this
time period, MDOR issued over 400 business non-filer notices that
generated hundreds of tax assessments and thirty-one notices of
intent to assess tax on Virginia taxpayers.110

103. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1–2, Harding, 103 Va. Cir. 211 (No.
CL17001145-00).
104. Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of His Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction at 1, Harding, 103 Va.
Cir. 211 (No. CL17001145-00).
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id. at 9.
107. Id. at 8–13.
108. Crutchfield Corp.’s Opposition to the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction at 5, Harding, 103 Va. Cir. 211 (No. CL17001145-00).
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id. at 6–7.
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MDOR responded that its contacts with Virginia unrelated to
the internet vendor regulation were irrelevant to the jurisdiction
analysis because it did not generate general jurisdiction over the
MDOR Commissioner.111 There were only three letters sent by
MDOR to Crutchfield and these three letters did not provide sufficient “minimum contact” of MDOR with Virginia to constitutionally support a finding of personal jurisdiction.112
In a brief letter opinion, the Albemarle County Circuit Court
held that under the limits imposed by the Due Process Clause, and
in examining the quality and nature of MDOR’s activity in Virginia, the three letters sent to Crutchfield were insufficient to confer jurisdiction over MDOR’s objection.113 The court granted
MDOR’s request to dismiss the case.114
2. ITFA Preempts Virginia’s Business, Professional, and
Occupational License Tax
The Fairfax County Circuit Court granted partial summary
judgment to Coxcom (d/b/a Cox Communications Northern Virginia) (“Cox”) holding that the ITFA preempts Fairfax County’s
Business, Professional, and Occupational License (“BPOL”) tax to
prevent imposition of the BPOL tax on Cox’s gross receipts from
internet access services for the 2013–2015 tax years.115 The circuit
court denied the county’s summary judgment motion and the court
shifted the burden of proof to Fairfax County to determine if the
county fell within the protection of the grandfather clause, which
would enable the county to assess its BPOL tax on Cox because it

111. Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue’s Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Further Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 2–3, Harding, 103 Va. Cir. 211 (No.
CL17001145-00).
112. See id. at 3.
113. Crutchfield Corp. v. Harding, 103 Va. Cir. 211, 211 (2019) (Albermarle County).
114. Id. In 2019, MDOR adopted new nexus standards for remote sellers. 830 MASS.
CODE REGS. 64 H.1.9 (2019). Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s five-to-four decision in
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., which clarified that physical presence is not necessary to
assert nexus, and implicitly endorsed the $100,000 threshold adopted by South Dakota,
Massachusetts along with many other states enacted new nexus laws governing sales tax
nexus for internet-based business activity. 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099–2100 (2018); see Jennifer
Dunn, Sales Tax by State: Economic Nexus Laws, TAX JAR (Jun. 5, 2020), https://blog.tax
jar.com/economic-nexus-laws/ [https://perma.cc/3AEX-A63K] (collecting various state economic nexus laws).
115. Bd. of Supervisors v. Coxcom, L.L.C., 104 Va. Cir. 248, 248–49 (2020) (Fairfax
County).
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was imposed before ITFA was enacted by Congress on October 1,
1998.116
In 2016, Cox sought a refund of BPOL taxes paid to Fairfax
County in tax years 2013, 2014, and 2015 on gross receipts from
internet access fees.117 Fairfax County issued a final determination
by the county’s tax commissioner that stated ITFA did not preempt
the BPOL tax and, even if it did, Fairfax County could keep collecting the tax under ITFA’s grandfather clause.118 Cox appealed the
county’s final determination to the state tax commissioner. The
state tax commissioner held that the county’s BPOL tax was
preempted by ITFA and remanded the dispute back to the county
to determine if it qualified for an exemption under ITFA’s grandfather provisions.119 Both parties then initiated this case to set
aside the state tax commissioner’s decision.120
On the cross summary judgment motions, Cox argued that the
BPOL tax is a “tax” as defined by ITFA.121 ITFA defines a tax as
“any charge imposed by any governmental entity for the purpose
of generating revenues for governmental purposes and . . . not a fee
imposed by a specific privilege, service, or benefit conferred.”122
Specifically, ITFA provides that “any charge imposed by any governmental entity” is unambiguous and the charge does not fall
within “a fee imposed for a specific privilege, service, or benefit conferred.”123 ITFA bars state and local governments from imposing
“[t]axes on Internet access.”124 Congress enacted ITFA in 1998 as a
temporary moratorium on state and local taxation of internet access. Congress extended that moratorium numerous times, including the 2013, 2014, and 2015 tax years at issue in this case.125 Cox
contended that Fairfax’s BPOL tax “violates ITFA because it is a

116. Id. at 248, 252.
117. Id. at 249.
118. Id. at 248–49.
119. Id. at 249.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (Moratorium on Internet Taxes).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Coxcom, 104 Va. Cir. at 249. In February 2016, the moratorium became permanent.
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 922, 130 Stat.
122, 281 (2016).
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tax on gross receipts, including those receipts derived from internet access.”126 Thus, Cox request[ed the] return of any taxes collected from its internet access receipts, . . . unless the [c]ounty
could prove that the tax was enforced and therefore grandfatheredin prior to the October 1, 1998[] enactment of ITFA.”127
“[Fairfax] County argue[d] that the BPOL tax is excluded as it
falls under ITFA’s ‘fees for specific privilege’ exception.”128 Specifically, the county argued that it is a fee imposed on a business for
the privilege of operating a business in a locality in Virginia.129 The
county also disagreed with Cox on the impact of the recent Supreme Court of Virginia decision in Dulles Duty Free, L.L.C. v.
County of Loudoun, which held that the BPOL tax is a direct tax
on the export of goods in transit.130 The court noted that
the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, a legislative body, imposes
the charge on every business operating in the county. The taxes go
into the general fund and are used for general purposes. Thus, the
BPOL tax is just that, a tax. Whereas a fee, which is excluded from
ITFA, is used for a specific and narrow purpose. Therefore, despite the
[county’s] contention that BPOL tax is used for a specific privilege, it
is still a tax.131

Cox then argued “that the definition of a ‘tax on internet access’
is defined as any tax that burdens internet access irrespective of
who the tax is imposed on and regardless of the terminology used
to describe the tax.”132 The court stated that “Congress unequivocally drafted ITFA, which prohibits taxes on internet access in any
form except those listed by the exceptions. Thus, a tax on gross
receipts, including those receipts providing internet access, are in
violation of ITFA.”133 The circuit court concluded Cox was entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.134 “Accordingly, . . . the burden
now shifts to the County to prove that it falls within the protection

126. Coxcom, 104 Va. Cir. at 249.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 250.
129. Id.
130. See id. (quoting Dulles Duty Free, L.L.C. v. County of Loudoun, 294 Va. 9, 23, 803
S.E.2d 54, 62 (2017)). For a discussion of the Dulles Duty Free Supreme Court of Virginia
decision, see Craig D. Bell & Michael H. Brady, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Taxation,
53 U. RICH. L. REV. 135, 170–75 (2018).
131. Coxcom, 104 Va. Cir. at 251.
132. Id. at 252 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (Moratorium on Internet Taxes)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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of the grandfather clause.”135 As the county’s motion for summary
judgment was denied and Cox’s motion for partial summary judgment was granted, the case continues on for further proceedings.136
C. Attorney General of Virginia Advises a Locality that the State
Cannot Charge It Interest on Sales Tax Revenues Wrongly
Paid and Required to be Returned
The Commissioner of the Revenue for the City of Manassas
sought advice concerning “whether the Commonwealth of Virginia,
through its Department of Taxation, has the authority to require a
locality to pay interest on local sales tax revenues erroneously forwarded to the locality by the Commonwealth, when repaid by the
locality upon notification of the error.”137 The erroneous local sales
tax payments the City of Manassas received were due to a coding
error made by a local business who “used the wrong Federal Information Processing Standards . . . code when remitting sales tax
revenues to the [State] Tax Commissioner.”138 The “error resulted
in the Commonwealth crediting and paying the one percent local
share of the retail sales tax to the City of Manassas, rather than to
Prince William County where the sales were made.”139
Upon correcting the error, the Virginia Tax Department maintained that under Virginia Code section 58.1-1833, Manassas must
pay interest on these payments.140 The Manassas Commissioner of
the Revenue questioned whether section 58.1-1833 authorizes or
requires the assessment of interest on the sales tax erroneously
distributed to the City.141
The Attorney General of Virginia noted that Virginia Code section 58.1-605(F) speaks to the issue of incorrect distributions of local sales tax revenues from the Commonwealth to the locality by
providing that “[i]f errors are made in any such payment, or adjustments are otherwise necessary . . . the errors shall be corrected
and adjustments made in the payments for the next two months

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
2019 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 56.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56–57.
Id.
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. . .”142 “Notably, this [statutory provision] does not mention interest, but refers only to correcting a payment error by adjusting such
future payments.”143 Looking at Virginia Code section 58.11833(A), which “provides general authority for the addition of interest on tax refunds that are ‘permitted or required . . . on monies
improperly collected from the taxpayer,’” there is no mention in the
statute as to payments by a locality, only a taxpayer.144 “By its
plain language, [Virginia Code section] 58.1-1833(A) requires interest to be paid by the Commonwealth to the taxpayer on refunds
resulting from correction of a tax assessment by the Tax Commissioner or by a court of law.”145 The Attorney General opined that
section 58.1-1833(A) “does not apply to a locality’s refund to the
state of erroneously distributed [local] sales tax revenues.”146 Instead, section 58.1-605(F) provides the statutory requirement to
correct erroneously distributed local sales tax through adjustments
over the next two succeeding months.147 This statute does not require payment of interest on the amount of local sales tax refunded
to the Commonwealth.148 The Attorney General concluded no such
interest may be assessed or collected by the Tax Department.149
II. TAXES ADMINISTERED BY LOCALITIES
A. Significant Legislative Activity
1. Real Estate Taxation
2020 saw the passage of a number of bills designed to address
blighted, derelict, and tax delinquent properties.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 57 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a. Blighted Properties and Derelict Buildings in Certain
Localities Made Separate Class that May be Subjected to
Increased Taxation or Judicial Sale
Under the Virginia Constitution, the lodestar for real property
taxation is uniformity in the measure of assessment and the rate
of taxation imposed.150 The Virginia Constitution also provides for
certain exceptions from the rule of uniformity for real property taxation.151 Blighted properties and derelict buildings are not addressed specifically. Yet the General Assembly retains the authority to “define and classify taxable subjects,”152 and it elected to
exercise that authority in 2020 with respect to “blighted properties” and “derelict buildings” in “qualifying localit[ies].”153
Using definitions for these terms found elsewhere in the Virginia
Code,154 the General Assembly declared both blighted properties
and derelict buildings “along with the land such properties are located on, . . . to be separate class[es] of property [that] constitute
separate classification[s] for local taxation of real property” if located in a qualifying locality.155

150. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Telecomms. Indus., Inc., 246 Va. 472, 477, 436 S.E.2d 442,
445 (1993) (“[W]hen it is impossible to achieve both fair market value and uniformity, the
preferred standard is uniformity.”).
151. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. X, § 1 (permitting the General Assembly to authorize “differences in the rate of taxation to be imposed upon real estate by a city or town within all
or parts of areas added to its territorial limits, or by a new unit of general government,
within its area, created by or encompassing two or more, or parts of two or more, existing
units of general government”); id. (permitting the General Assembly to authorize localities
“to provide for differences in the rate of taxation imposed upon tangible personal property
owned by persons not less than sixty-five years of age or persons permanently and totally
disabled”); id. § 2 (“The General Assembly may define and classify real estate devoted to
agricultural, horticultural, forest, or open space uses, and may by general law authorize any
county, city, town, or regional government to allow deferral of, or relief from, portions of
taxes otherwise payable on such real estate if it were not so classified. . . .”); id. §§ 6, 6-A, 6B (expressly authorizing various exemptions from taxation).
152. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3221.1 to -3221.5 (Repl. Vol.
2017 & Cum. Supp. 2020).
153. Act of Apr. 22, 2020, ch. 1213, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58.1-3221.6 (Cum. Supp. 2020), and codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3965
(Cum. Supp. 2020)).
154. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221.6(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
155. Id. § 58.1-3221.6(B)–(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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The “real estate assessor of the locality” will determine whether
real estate “constitutes either a blighted property or derelict structure,” and whether that condition has been abated.156 The assessor’s determination is subject to judicial review as an “erroneous
assessment.”157
If determined to be a blighted property, the real estate may be
subjected to an increased rate of taxation, up to five percent greater
than “the rate applicable to the general classes of real property.”158
Similarly, if determined to host a derelict building, it may be subjected to an increased rate of taxation, up to ten percent greater
than “the rate applicable to the general class of real property.”159
The General Assembly also revised the statute addressing judicial sales to collect delinquent taxes, permitting qualifying localities to accelerate the judicial sale process with respect to a blighted
property or a derelict building. Under general law, “[w]hen any
taxes on any real estate in a locality are delinquent on December
31 following the second anniversary of the date on which such
taxes have become due, . . . such real estate may be sold for the
purpose of collecting all delinquent taxes on such property.”160 The
period of required delinquency prior to sale is only one year for real
property on which is situated a condemned structure, a nuisance,
a derelict building, or any property that has been declared to be
blighted.161
House Bill 755 created a third class, applicable where “abatement costs” are incurred to address any of the foregoing conditions.162 In those cases, a qualifying locality may proceed to judicial
sale to collect all delinquent taxes and abatement costs following
the passage of six months, rather than one year, from both “the
date on which such taxes became due” and “the date on which the
abatement costs were first incurred.”163

156. Id. § 58.1-3221.6(F) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
157. Id. §§ 58.1-3980 to -3995 (Repl. Vol. 2017 & Cum. Supp. 2020).
158. Id. § 58.1-3221.6(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
159. Id. § 58.1-3221.6(E) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
160. Id. § 58.1-3965(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
161. Id.
162. Act of Apr. 22, 2020, ch. 1213, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3965(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
163. Id. at __.
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b. Non-Judicial Sale of Delinquent Lands Expanded
Prior to the recent amendment,
[a] treasurer or other officer responsible for collecting taxes may sell,
at public auction, any unimproved parcel of real property that is assessed at less than $5,000, provided that the taxes on such parcel are
delinquent on December 31 following the third anniversary of the date
on which such taxes have become due, [without judicial involvement.]164

Note that the parcel had to be “unimproved” and the assessed value
less than $5000. The treasurer or other tax collector could also sell,
without judicial oversight, real property assessed at $5000 or more,
but less than $20,000, to satisfy such delinquent taxes provided
that the property “is not subject to a recorded mortgage or deed of
trust lien” and meets any one of six other conditions listed under
the same statutory provision.165 These include properties that have
been condemned, declared a nuisance, found to host “a derelict
building,” or “declared by the locality to be blighted.”166
In keeping with the program of facilitating collection of delinquent real estate taxes, the General Assembly also adopted House
Bill 1582, legislation that garnered no opposing votes.167 That legislation increased the assessed value at which a non-judicial sale
could occur to satisfy delinquent taxes even if the property was
subject to a recorded mortgage or deed of trust lien and none of the
six conditions obtained, from less than $5000 to up to $10,000, and
removed the limitation on sales of improved parcels.168 With respect to properties that were long delinquent, not subject to a recorded mortgage or deed of trust lien and that were subject to one
of the six conditions, the legislation also increased the assessed
value range, from between $5000 and $20,000 to between $10,001
to $25,000.169 Finally, House Bill 1582 expanded one of the six conditions, which previously had required that the unimproved parcel

164. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3975(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
165. Id. § 58.1-3975(B)(1)–(6) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
166. Id. § 58.1-3975(B)(3)–(6) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
167. H.B. 1582 Delinquent Tax Lands; Threshold for Nonjudicial Sale, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO.
SYS., https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+sum+HB1582 [https://perma.cc/QY5JW2B8].
168. Act of Mar. 10, 2020, ch. 257, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3975(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
169. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3975(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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be less than a tenth of an acre, to embrace unimproved properties
that are up to an acre in size.170
c. Non-Profit Organization’s Sale of Delinquent Lands Obtained
by Order of Special Commissioner
Virginia law provides localities with a range of mechanisms for
recovering delinquent real estate taxes or other charges, which operate as a lien on real estate, including judicial sale of the delinquent lands by public auction.171 Under certain defined circumstances, a locality may bypass the process of a public auction of the
property that is subject to a tax or other lien, and petition a circuit
court for appointment of a special commissioner to transfer title to
the delinquent land to the locality.172
For parcels in the Cities of Norfolk, Richmond, Hopewell, Martinsville, Newport News, Petersburg, and Fredericksburg, the locality may petition the circuit court to appoint a special commissioner to execute the necessary deed or deeds to convey the real
estate to the locality in lieu of the sale at public auction if
(i) each parcel has delinquent real estate taxes or the locality has a
lien against the parcel for removal, repair or securing of a building or
structure; removal of trash, garbage, refuse, litter; or the cutting of
grass, weeds or other foreign growth, (ii) each parcel has an assessed
value of $75,000 or less, and (iii) such taxes and liens, together, including penalty and accumulated interest, exceed thirty-five percent
of the assessed value of the parcel or such taxes alone exceed fifteen
percent of the assessed value of the parcel or parcels.173

These localities may follow the same procedure if the delinquent
land has an assessed value of $150,000 or less; is not an occupied
dwelling; and “such taxes and liens, together, including penalty
and accumulated interest, exceed twenty percent of the assessed
value of the parcel or such taxes alone exceed ten percent of the
assessed value of the parcel or parcels.”174 In that case, however,
the locality must then “enter[] into an agreement for sale of the
parcel to a nonprofit organization to renovate or construct a single-

170.
2020)).
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3975(B)(1) (Cum. Supp.
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3965(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-3970.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 58.1-3970.1(A)–(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id.
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family dwelling on the parcel for sale to a person or persons to reside in the dwelling whose income is below the area median income.”175
House Bill 535 imposed some restrictions on the nonprofit organization’s alienation of such delinquent lands.176 The nonprofit
may sell “(i) both the land and the structural improvements on a
property or (ii) only the structural improvements of a property and
not the land the structural improvements are located on.”177 If only
the structural improvements are sold, and not the land, then the
land must be “subject to a ground lease with a community land
trust” that “has a term of at least 90 years,” and the community
land trust must “retain[] a preemptive option to purchase such
structural improvements at a price determined by a formula that
is designed to ensure that the improvements remain affordable in
perpetuity to low-income and moderate-income families earning
less than 120 percent of the area median income, adjusted for family size.”178
d. Richmond Allowed to Tax Improvements at Lesser Rate than
Land
Prior to the recent amendment, Virginia Code section 58.13221.1 declared improvements to real property in only three cities—Fairfax, Poquoson, and Roanoke—to be “a separate class of
property” than the land on which it sits for purposes of real estate
taxation.179 Having surmounted the uniformity hurdle,180 the section authorized two of those cities—Fairfax and Roanoke—to levy
any lesser rate on the improvements that is higher than zero, as
zero would function as an exemption.181 The same section, conversely, authorized Poquoson simply to levy on improvements “at
a different rate” higher than zero, and so potentially to impose a

175. Id. § 58.1-3970.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
176. Act of Mar. 10, 2020, ch. 244, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3970.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
177. Id. at __.
178. Id. at __.
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
180. See VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
181. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3221.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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greater or lesser rate on improvements than on land.182 None of the
localities could “alter in any way its valuation of real property.”183
In 2020, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
58.1-3221.1 to declare the same separate class of property in the
City of Richmond and to delegate to Richmond the same taxing
power previously delegated to the Cities of Fairfax and Roanoke,
subject to the same restrictions.184
2. Exemptions
a. Reduction of Local Ad Valorem Tax Exemptions for Solar
Energy Projects
Historically, certain solar energy projects enjoyed a total exemption from local taxation.185 Other solar energy projects enjoyed an
exemption from ad valorem taxation for eighty percent of a project’s assessed value.186 In all cases, this exemption did not extend
to “the land on which such equipment or facilities are located,” and
was available for projects greater than twenty megawatts only if
construction began by January 1, 2024.187
In 2020, the General Assembly, in adopting House Bill 1434 and
Senate Bill 763, expanded the class of solar energy projects subject
to the time limitation and substantially extended the time in which
the exemption could be claimed.188 Now, solar energy projects
greater than five megawatts are subject to the time limitation, but
the exemption may be claimed so long as “an application has been
filed with the locality for . . . project[s] before July 1, 2030.”189

182. Id. § 58.1-3221.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
183. Id. § 58.1-3221.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
184. Act of Apr. 7, 2020, ch. 790, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3221.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660 (Cum. Supp. 2019).
186. Id. § 58.1-3660(B) (Cum. Supp. 2019).
187. Id.
188. Acts of Apr. 10, 2020, chs. 1028 & 1029, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
189. Id. at __, __. This application requirement is satisfied if
[the] applicant has filed an application for a zoning confirmation from the locality for a by-right use or an application for land use approval under the locality’s zoning ordinance to include an application for a conditional use permit,
special use permit, special exception, or other application as set out in the locality’s zoning ordinance.
Id. at __, __.
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This legislation also adopted a stepped-down exemption for the
solar energy projects entitled to an eighty percent exemption under
the previous law and “for which an initial interconnection request
form has been filed with an electric utility or a regional transmission organization on or after January 1, 2019.”190 Now, those solar
energy projects are entitled to an eighty percent exemption only “in
the first five years in service after commencement of commercial
operation,” at which point the exemption is reduced to “70 percent
of the assessed value” for “the second five years in service,” and,
after then, further reduced to an exemption of “60 percent of the
assessed value for all remaining years in service.”191
b. Localities May Impose Revenue Sharing on Certain Solar
Energy Projects, Thereby Increasing Exemption
Building on prior legislation on solar energy projects, the General Assembly enacted House Bill 1131 and Senate Bill 762, which
authorized localities to “assess a revenue share of up to $1,400 per
megawatt” on certain solar energy projects.192 The solar energy
projects are limited to solar energy projects greater than five megawatts or, in the case of solar energy projects for which “an initial
interconnection request form has been filed with an electric utility
or a regional transmission organization on or before December 31,
2018,” twenty megawatts or less, but cannot “include any project
that is . . . described in § 56-594, 56-594.01, or 56-594.2 or [c]hapters 358 and 382 of the Acts of Assembly of 2013, as amended.”193
If a revenue share is assessed pursuant to this legislation on a
solar energy project of more than five megawatts, “as measured in
alternating current (AC) generation capacity,” and “an application
has been filed with the locality for the project before July 1, 2030,”
a 100 percent exemption applies.194 Otherwise, the stepped down

190. Id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660(F) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
191. Id. at __, __.
192. Acts of Apr. 22, 2020, chs. 1224 & 1270, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-2636(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)). Megawatt capacity is “measured in alternating current (AC) generation capacity of the nameplate capacity of the facility based
on submissions by the facility owner to the interconnecting utility.” Id. at __, __.
193. Id. at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-2636(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
194. Id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660(D) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
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exemption provided by House Bill 1434 and Senate Bill 763, and
reviewed above, applies.195
No revenue share may be applied “retroactively . . . to any solar
photovoltaic (electric energy) project for which an application was
filed with the locality on or before July 1, 2020” unless the taxpayer
and locality agree.196
c. Exemption for Solar Energy and Recycling Equipment Made
Retroactive to Date of Installation
Before July 1, 2020, “[c]ertified solar energy equipment, facilities, or devices and certified recycling equipment, facilities, or devices” were a separate class of property that localities could exempt
or partially exempt from local taxation.197 Such an exemption is
permitted by Article X, section 6(d) of the Virginia Constitution.
For recycling equipment, facilities, or devices to enjoy this exemption, they must be, among other things,
certified by the Department of Environmental Quality as integral to
the recycling process and for use primarily for the purpose of abating
or preventing pollution of the atmosphere or waters of the Commonwealth, and used in manufacturing facilities or plant units which
manufacture, process, compound, or produce for sale recyclable items
of tangible personal property at fixed locations in the Commonwealth.198

For “solar energy equipment, facilities, or devices” to enjoy this exemption, they must be, among other things, “certified by the local
certifying authority to be designed and used primarily for the purpose of collecting, generating, transferring, or storing thermal or
electric energy.”199
Before July 1, 2020, however, the “exemption [was] effective beginning in the next succeeding tax year” or, in the case of real estate taxation, “when such real estate [was] first assessed, but not
prior to the date of such application for exemption.”200

195. See id. at __, __; Acts of Apr. 10, 2020, chs. 1028 & 1029, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __,
__ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3660(F) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
196. Chs. 1224 & 1270, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __.
197. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3661(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
198. Id. § 58.1-3661(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
199. Id.
200. Id. § 58.1-3661(D) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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Senate Bill 1039 allows localities to revise the foregoing rule regarding the timing of the exemption for “equipment, facilities, or
devices.”201 Under this legislation, a locality may provide by ordinance that “if the taxpayer installs equipment, facilities, or devices
and obtains certification for such equipment, facilities, or devices
within one year of installation, . . . the exemption shall be effective
as of the date of installation, and” to further reimburse the taxpayer “if the taxpayer has paid any taxes on such equipment, facilities, or devices” in the meantime.202
d. Duration of Partial Exemption for Construction or
Improvement in Redevelopment, Conservation, or
Rehabilitation District May Be Extended
Localities are permitted under Virginia law to create a “redevelopment or conservation area or a rehabilitation district”203 and
may provide by ordinance a “partial exemption from taxation of (i)
new structures located in a redevelopment or conservation area or
rehabilitation district or (ii) other improvements to real estate located in a redevelopment or conservation area or rehabilitation district.”204 The ordinance provides “[t]he partial exemption . . . shall
be either (i) an amount equal to the increase in assessed value or a
percentage of such increase resulting from the construction of the
new structure or other improvement . . . , or (ii) an amount up to
50 percent of the cost of such construction or improvement . . . .”205
This partial exemption “may commence upon completion of the
new construction or improvement or on January 1 of the year following completion of the new construction or improvement and
shall run with the real estate . . . .”206 Significantly, for purposes of
this article, the prior law was that it could last for “a period of no
longer than 15 years.”207
That period may now be lengthened. Senate Bill 727 and House
Bill 537 doubled the maximum duration of the partial exemption,

201. Act of Apr. 2, 2020, ch. 633, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3661(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
202. Id. at __.
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3219.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
204. Id.
205. Id. § 58.1-3219.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
206. Id.
207. Id. § 58.1-3219.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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to thirty years, presumably to incentivize more substantial investments in such districts.208 Of course, it remains the case that the
locality’s ordinance “may place a shorter time limitation on the
length of such exemption.”209
3. Tangible Personal Property Taxation
a. Farm Machinery and Implements Used for Growing and
Harvesting Trees May Be Exempted or Taxed at a Lower Rate
than Other Tangible Personal Property
Under current law, tangible personal property is divided into numerous separate classes for purposes of valuation. Virginia Code
section 58.1-3505(A) specifically defines various farm-related tangible personal property and puts them into different classes. “Farm
machinery” is classified as either “[f]arm machinery designed
solely for the planting, production or harvesting of a single product
or commodity”210 and all other “farm machinery . . . and farm implements,” among which expressly include machinery and equipment used by wineries, by nurseries, and any “farm tractor.”211 Localities may exempt, in whole or in part, or provide a different rate
of taxation than is generally applicable to tangible personal property for “farm machinery” and other personal property within these
classes (or within the other classes set forth in section 58.13505(A)).212
The General Assembly, through House Bill 1021, created in Virginia Code section 58.1-3505(A)(14) a new class of farm-related
tangible personal property that localities may exempt.213 This new
class consists of “farm machinery and farm implements” other than
those identified previously, and expressly includes “equipment and
machinery used for forest harvesting and silvicultural activities.”214 House Bill 1021 also made various revisions to section

208. Acts of Mar. 2 & 10, 2020, chs. 66 & 246, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3219.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
209. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3219.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
210. Id. § 58.1-3505(A)(10) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
211. Id. § 58.1-3505(A)(8) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
212. Id. § 58.1-3505(A)–(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
213. Act of Mar. 10, 2020, ch. 251, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3505(A)(14) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
214. Id. at __.
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58.1-3506, addressing the taxation of “forest harvesting and silvicultural activity equipment” to reflect this potential exemption.215
b. Classification for Property Used in Satellite Industry
Extended
Returning to Virginia Code section 58.1-3506, we find a separate
tax classification for “tangible personal property that is used in
manufacturing, testing, or operating satellites within a Multicounty Transportation Improvement District, provided that such
business personal property is put into service within the District
on or after July 1, 1999.”216 However, this classification expired by
its terms on June 30, 2019.217
Senate Bill 273 and House Bill 724 “revived” the classification,
pushing the date-based expiration back to June 30, 2029.218 And
the General Assembly made this change effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2019, meaning that there was no tax
year in which this classification did not apply.219
4. BPOL Taxation/Merchants’ Capital Tax—Merchants’ Capital
Class for Retailers with Large Storage Facilities Created
Article 3 of chapter 35 of Title 58.1 defines from the mass of tangible personal property “[t]he capital of merchants” and segregates
it for permissive local taxation.220 Since 1997, the Virginia Code
has had only one separate class from the general class of merchants’ capital—that “reported as inventory of pharmaceutical
wholesalers.”221 In 2018, another separate class of merchants’ capital was created—that “of any wholesaler reported as inventory

215. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3506(A)(8), (33) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
216. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3506(A)(21) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
217. Id. § 58.1-3506(A)(21) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
218. Acts of Mar. 2 & 10, 2020, chs. 64 & 247, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3506(A)(21) (Cum. Supp. 2020)). The classification may
expire before this date if “a special improvements tax is no longer levied under § 15.24607 on property within a Multicounty Transportation Improvement District created pursuant to Chapter 46 (§ 15.2-4600 et seq.) of Title 15.2.” VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3506(A)(21)
(Cum. Supp. 2020).
219. Chs. 64 & 247, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __.
220. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3509 (Repl. Vol. 2017); see id. § 58.1-3510(A) (Repl. Vol. 2017)
(defining “[m]erchants’ capital”).
221. Id. § 58.1-3510.01 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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that is located, and is normally located, in a structure that contains
at least 100,000 square feet, with at least 100,000 square feet used
solely to store such inventory.”222 For both of these separate classifications, localities “may levy a tax . . . at different rates from the
tax levied on other merchants’ capital[,]” but may not adopt a “rate
of tax” or “of assessment” that “exceed[s] that applicable generally
to merchants’ capital.”223
House Bill 1575 revised the separate classification for wholesalers found in section 58.1-3510.02 to include retailers with at least
twice as much storage.224 Now, merchants’ capital of “any retailer
reported as inventory that is located, and is normally located, in a
structure that contains at least 200,000 square feet, with at least
200,000 square feet used solely to store such inventory” is part of
the separate class in section 58.1-3510.02.225 As a result, it too may
also be subjected to “different rates” of tax than “other merchants’
capital” provided they do not “exceed that applicable generally to
merchants’ capital.”226
5. Miscellaneous Local Taxation
a. Authorization of Counties to Impose Additional Admissions,
Transient and Occupancy and Cigarette Taxes
Virginia localities enjoy widely varying powers with respect to
the imposition of taxes depending on, among other factors, their
status as a county, city or town. Additionally, some localities of the
same type may impose certain miscellaneous taxes that others may
not.227
House Bill 785 and Senate Bill 588, as part of a drive for greater
uniformity between the various classes of localities, largely harmonized localities’ taxing authority with respect to admissions, transient occupancy, food and beverage/meals, cigarette, and travel

222. Act of Feb. 26, 2018, ch. 23, 2018 Va. Acts 59, 59 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.13510.02 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
223. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3510.01 (Repl. Vol. 2017); id. § 58.1-3510.02 (Cum. Supp.
2020).
224. Act of Mar. 31, 2020, ch. 541, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3510.02 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
225. Id. at __.
226. Id. at __.
227. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3818(A)–(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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campground taxes.228 This was done by amending section 58.13840, which previously authorized these types of miscellaneous
taxation by cities and towns, to make the authorization similarly
applicable to counties.229
With respect to admissions taxes, which are governed by article
five of chapter 38 of Title 58.1, the General Assembly amended section 58.1-3818 to create a uniform rule for localities regarding the
levying of “a tax on admissions charged for attendance at any
event.”230 In doing so, it prohibited counties that imposed “a state
sales and use tax, in addition to the taxes authorized pursuant to
§§ 58.1-603 and 58.1-604, . . . at a rate of at least one percent, a
portion of which is dedicated to the promotion of tourism” to also
impose an admissions tax.231 Consistent with the changes to Virginia Code section 58.1-3818, sections that had provided unique
admissions tax rules for specific localities were repealed.232
Turning to transient occupancy taxes, which are governed by article six of chapter 38 of Title 58.1, the General Assembly amended
section 58.1-3819 to remove the prohibition against charging more
than two percent of the amount of charge for the occupancy (or
more than five percent for certain, less populous counties).233 Rather than generally prohibit taxation at these levels, amended section 58.1-3819 directs that all funding in excess of that provided by
a two percent rate, but less than that resulting from a rate in excess of five percent, be used for the same purposes as it was before
this amendment or, if not applicable, “solely for tourism and travel,
marketing of tourism or initiatives that . . . attract travelers to the
locality, increase occupancy at lodging properties, and generate
tourism revenues in the locality.”234 Unlike with admissions taxes,
most of the authorizations relating to application of additional

228. Acts of Apr. 22, 2020, chs. 1214 & 1263, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3840 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
229. Id. at __, __.
230. Id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3818(A)–(B) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
231. Id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3818(C) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
232. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3818.01, -3818.03, -3818.04 (Cum. Supp. 2020), repealed by
Acts of Apr. 22, 2020, chs. 1214 & 1263, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __.
233. Chs. 1214 & 1263, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58.1-3819(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
234. Id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3819(A)(2) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
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transient and occupancy taxation were left intact.235 These amendments are effective May 1, 2021.236
House Bill 785 and Senate Bill 588 extended the power of counties to tax food and beverage by, first, permitting adoption of such
taxation without a referendum or unanimous vote of the governing
body.237 Second, House Bill 785 and Senate Bill 588 increased the
cap on food and beverage taxation, from four to six percent “of the
amount charged for such food and beverages.”238
Virginia Code section 58.1-3830 was amended to affirm the
power of every county, city, and town, not merely the counties of
Arlington and Fairfax239 and those municipalities with general taxing powers by charter, to tax the sale or use of cigarettes.240 However, this power was circumscribed.241 The maximum rate that
may be imposed by counties, as well as those cities and towns “that,
on January 1, 2020, had in effect a rate not exceeding two cents
($0.02) per cigarette sold,” will be “two cents ($0.02) per cigarette
sold.”242 For those cities and towns “that, on January 1, 2020, had
in effect a rate exceeding two cents ($0.02) per cigarette sold, then
the maximum rate” that may be charged will “be the rate in effect
on January 1, 2020.”243 Note the will—these amendments will not
be effective until July 1, 2021.244

235. See id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3823, -3825.3 (Cum.
Supp. 2020)); but cf. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3820 to -3821 (Cum. Supp. 2020), repealed by
Chs. 1214 & 1263, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __.
236. Chs. 1214 & 1263, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __.
237. Id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3833 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
In those counties where a referendum was defeated prior to July 1, 2020, no food and beverage tax may be imposed “until six years after the date of such referendum, unless a successful referendum was held after the defeated referendum and before July 1, 2020.” Id. at
__, __. Note that the voting requirements on imposing taxes found in VA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 7 and VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1428 (Repl. Vol. 2018) remain.
238. Chs. 1214 & 1263, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58.1-3833(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
239. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3831 (Repl. Vol. 2017), repealed by Chs. 1214 & 1263,
2020 Va. Acts at __, __.
240. Chs. 1214 & 1263, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58.1-3830(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
241. Id. at __, __.
242. Id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3830(C)(1) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
243. Id. at __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3830(C)(2) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
244. Id. at __, __.
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b. Exemption for De Minimis Farmer’s Market and Roadside
Sales from Meals Tax and Food and Beverage Taxation
As referenced above, Virginia cities and towns may impose a
meals tax and counties may impose a food and beverage tax.245
Both of these taxes are in addition to sales and use taxes and are
subject to various statutory exceptions.246
House Bill 342 added a similar exemption to both food and beverage and meals taxes.247 The county food and beverage tax now
may “not be levied on food and beverages sold . . . by . . . sellers at
local farmers markets and roadside stands, when such sellers’ annual income from such sales does not exceed $2,500” in all localities.248 Similarly, “[n]o such taxes on meals may be imposed on
when sold or provided by . . . sellers at local farmers markets and
roadside stands, when such sellers’ annual income from such sales
does not exceed $2,500” in all localities.249
6. Tax Enforcement
a. Urban Counties May Agree to Collect Town Taxes
In 2018, Loudoun County was authorized to “enter into an agreement with any town located partially or wholly within Loudoun
County for the county treasurer to collect and enforce delinquent
or non-delinquent real or personal property taxes owed to such
town.”250
Building on this legislation, House Bill 1534 and Senate Bill 649
amended the provision governing tax collection under the urban
county executive form of government, Virginia Code section 15.2826, to authorize broadly these sorts of arrangements.251 Under

245. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3833(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2019) (county food and beverage
tax); id. § 58.1-3840 (Repl. Vol. 2017) (excise taxes on, among other things, “meals”).
246. Id. § 58.1-3833(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020); id. § 58.1-3840 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
247. See Act of Mar. 10, 2020, ch. 241, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3833, -3840 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
248. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3833(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
249. Id. § 58.1-3840(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
250. Acts of Mar. 2 & 19, 2018, chs. 74 & 342, 2020 Va. Acts 158, 158 & 607, 607 (codified
as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3910.1 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
251. Acts of Mar. 27, 2020, chs. 504 & 505, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified as
amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-826 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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this legislation, the relevant board of supervisors for all such localities
may enter into an agreement, similar to such agreements as are authorized under § 58.1-3910.1, with any town located partially or
wholly within the county for the official responsible for the assessment
or collection of taxes to collect and enforce delinquent or non-delinquent real or personal property taxes owed to such town.252

B. Significant Judicial Decisions
1. Supreme Court of Virginia Rules Real Property Tax
Assessments Were Not Entitled to Presumption of
Correctness—Message to Local Tax Authorities?
In reversing a decision of the Augusta County Circuit Court, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court erred in upholding the county’s tax assessments against McKee Foods Corporation (“McKee”) for tax years 2011–2014 because the appraisers
for the county improperly applied valuation methodologies, making the resulting assessments ineligible for a presumption of correctness.253 McKee owns an 828,619 square foot industrial building
where it manufactures “Little Debbie” snack foods and other products.254 In 2011, 2012, and 2013, Augusta County assessed McKee’s
property at $28,525,300, and for 2014, the County raised the assessment to $31,745,800.255 McKee challenged all four assessments
contending the actual fair market value was in the range of
$16,000,000 to $17,660,000 over the four tax years.256
For tax years 2011 through 2013, Augusta County’s assessments
were performed by Blue Ridge Mass Appraisal Company, L.L.C.
(“Blue Ridge”).257 David Hickey (“Hickey”) was the Blue Ridge employee who conducted the assessment of McKee’s property for that
time period.258 Hickey testified he used a cost method to appraise
McKee’s property, and then he “referred to a list of 52 industrial
sales he had previously accumulated to see if he was in the correct

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at __, __.
McKee Foods Corp. v. County of Augusta, 297 Va. 482, 830 S.E.2d 25 (2019).
Id. at 485, 830 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 485–86, 830 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 485–86, 830 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 485–86, 830 S.E.2d at 27.
Id. at 486, 830 S.E.2d at 27.
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range of price per square foot.”259 The properties on Hickey’s list
“ranged in size from 28,360 square feet to 714,278 square feet, and
all but two of the buildings on his list were less than half the square
footage” of the McKee property.260 Hickey admitted that he assessed the property using an average of the sale price divided by
the square footage for each of the fifty-two properties on the list.261
Hickey also added that the database management system utilized
by Blue Ridge was based on an old system dating back to the 1970s
and was not really a cost approach.262 Hickey “made no adjustments to the sale prices of the properties on the list to account for
the size of the properties, the location of the properties, or when in
the ten-year period the sales occurred.”263 Hickey also did not attempt to investigate “the nature of the sales (i.e., whether they
were arm’s length transactions) when he compiled his list.”264 His
assessment of McKee’s property simply used “an average of the
sale price divided by the square footage for each of the 52 properties on the list.”265
The 2014 assessment was prepared by another appraiser named
Donald Thomas (“Thomas”), who was employed by Wingate Appraisal Service.266 At the time Thomas assessed the McKee property, he was only a licensed residential real estate appraiser.267 The
person from Wingate Appraisal who was supposed to appraise the
property, and was a certified general real estate appraiser, did not
do the appraisal or supervise Thomas’ work on the McKee property
appraisal.268
Thomas testified he “classified [McKee’s] [p]roperty as a special
use property solely because it was originally designed and constructed to be used for food processing.”269 “He admitted, however,
that the main building on the property was a rectangular-shaped
industrial building” that could have been converted to a different

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 487, 830 S.E.2d at 27–28.
Id. at 487–88, 830 S.E.2d at 27–28.
Id. at 487–88, 830 S.E.2d at 27–28.
Id. at 487, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 488, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 488, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 488, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 488, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 488, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 488, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
Id. at 488, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
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use.270 Thomas testified that he appraised the property at the price
he figured McKee could sell it for to a buyer who also intended to
use the property as a food processing plant.271 He also said he did
not use the sales comparison method to value the property because
he could not find any comparable sales for special purpose food processing plants.272 Thomas also “rejected the income approach due
to a lack of rental market data because the property was owneroccupied.”273 He said the market for McKee’s property was national
in scope, but he admitted he did not search for rental data outside
Augusta County.274 He also did not search for comparable sales
outside of the eastern region of the United States.275
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated the statutory and judicial
standards or legal principles called upon when reviewing real property tax assessments for correctness.276 First, “[a]ssessments by
taxing authorities are afforded a presumption of correctness, and
the burden is on the taxpayer to rebut the presumption.”277 “Generally, a taxing authority’s assessment of a property’s fair market
value is presumed valid and a circuit court will reject and correct
a tax authority’s assessment only if the taxpayer demonstrates
that the taxing authority committed manifest error or disregarded
controlling evidence in making the assessment.”278
“Taxing authorities commonly use one or more of three valuation
approaches: the cost approach, income approach, and sales approach.”279 “Ideally, an appraisal should, if possible, derive its final
determination of a property’s value using all three approaches in
order to maximize the likelihood that the valuation accurately reflects the property’s fair market value.”280 “In cases where a taxing
authority bases an assessment of fair market value solely on one
270. Id. at 488, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
271. Id. at 488–89, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
272. Id. at 489, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
273. Id. at 489, 830 S.E.2d at 28.
274. Id. at 489, 830 S.E.2d at 28–29.
275. Id. at 489, 830 S.E.2d at 29.
276. Id. at 495–96, 830 S.E.2d at 28–29.
277. Id. at 496, 830 S.E.2d at 32 (quoting Tidewater Psychiatric Inst., Inc. v. City of
Virginia Beach, 256 Va. 136, 140–41, 501 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1998)).
278. Id. at 496, 830 S.E.2d at 32 (quoting Keswick Club, L.P. v. County of Albemarle,
273 Va. 128, 136–37, 639 S.E.2d 243, 247 (2007)).
279. Id. at 496, 830 S.E.2d at 32 (quoting Keswick Club, 273 Va. at 137, 639 S.E.2d at
248).
280. Id. at 496, 830 S.E.2d at 32 (quoting Keswick Club, 273 Va. at 137, 639 S.E.2d at
248).
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approach, the resulting assessment is still entitled to the presumption of validity so long as the taxing authority considered and
properly rejected the other valuation methods.”281
The Supreme Court of Virginia was able to point to numerous
places in the record where it is evident the locality’s assessments
were not compliant with generally accepted appraisal practices
and Virginia law.282 By Hickey’s own testimony, he “did not
properly use any of the three generally accepted approaches to valuation.”283 “First, Hickey did not perform an income approach valuation at all.”284 “Second, to the extent he considered comparable
sales, Hickey’s methodology was so improper it did not meet the
definition of the sales approach.”285 The court noted “Hickey identified 52 properties and simply used the average price per square
foot of these properties as the price per square foot for the McKee
property, without any adjustments for the size or location of the
other properties.”286 “[A]lthough the sales approach involves the
averages of properties, first,” the court stated, “an assessor must
find similar properties and make necessary adjustments, which
Hickey completely failed to do.”287
“Hickey also failed to properly utilize the cost approach. . . . Instead of estimating depreciation based upon the [McKee] [p]roperty’s actual characteristics, Hickey used the average price per
square foot to guide his depreciation.”288 “Even though Hickey
failed to properly utilize any of the three accepted valuation methods, the circuit court still applied the presumption of validity” to
the 2011 assessment.289 The supreme court held this was in error.290
For the 2014 assessment, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated,
“Thomas’ assessment was based upon a single valuation approach,
the cost approach.”291 “Because Thomas’ assessment of fair market
281. Id. at 496–97, 830 S.E.2d at 32–33 (citing Keswick Club, 273 Va. at 137, 639 S.E.2d
at 248).
282. Id. at 496–97, 830 S.E.2d at 32–33.
283. Id. at 497, 830 S.E.2d at 33.
284. Id. at 497, 830 S.E.2d at 33.
285. Id. at 497, 830 S.E.2d at 33.
286. Id. at 497, 830 S.E.2d at 33.
287. Id. at 497–98, 830 S.E.2d at 33.
288. Id. at 498, 830 S.E.2d at 33.
289. Id. at 498–500, 830 S.E.2d at 33–34.
290. Id. at 498–500, 830 S.E.2d at 33–34.
291. Id. at 500, 830 S.E.2d at 35.

BELL BRADY 551 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

192

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

11/30/2020 4:10 PM

[Vol. 55:151

value [was] based solely on the cost approach, the resulting assessment [was] only entitled to the presumption of correctness if the
taxing authority considered and properly rejected the other valuation methods.”292 The evidence at trial demonstrates that Thomas
applied the cost approach without sufficiently attempting to gather
the data necessary to utilize the income or sales approach.293 The
supreme court held the circuit court also erred when it applied the
presumption of correctness to the 2014 assessments; thus all of the
assessments in the case were erroneous and not entitled to a presumption of correctness.294 The court reversed and remanded the
decision of the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
the court’s holdings.295
2. The Supreme Court of Virginia Concludes Trial Court
Wrongly Excluded Taxpayer’s Appraiser’s Testimony in
Property Tax Refund Dispute
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that for Virginia property
tax purposes, the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded
testimony from Virginia International Gateway, Inc.’s (“VIG”) appraiser because a real estate appraiser is not required to have an
active Virginia license to testify as an expert in a tax assessment
dispute.296 In Virginia International Gateway, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth, VIG, the landowner of a large marine container terminal in
the City of Portsmouth, believed that the City’s property tax assessments of $361 million in real property and $30 million in personal property in the 2015–2016 tax year were excessively above
fair market value.297 VIG’s terminal consists of 610 acres, fronting
on the Elizabeth River, “including a wharf, buildings, eight ‘shipto-shore’ (‘STS’) cranes,” thirty rail mounted gantry cranes, and
four rubber-tire gantry cranes.298 The rail-mounted and the rubber-tire gantry cranes were considered personal property.299 The
STS cranes were considered fixtures.300

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 501, 830 S.E.2d at 35 (citing Keswick Club, 273 Va. at 137, 639 S.E.2d at 248).
Id. at 501, 830 S.E.2d at 35.
Id. at 501–02, 830 S.E.2d at 34–35.
Id. at 502, 830 S.E.2d at 35–36.
Va. Int’l Gateway, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth, 298 Va. 43, 834 S.E.2d 234 (2019).
Id. at 47, 834 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 46–47, 834 S.E.2d at 235–36.
Id. at 47, 834 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 47, 834 S.E.2d at 236.
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“At trial, VIG offered expert testimony to support its position
that the actual fair market value of the real property was
$197,217,000.”301 VIG’s expert witness testimony was provided by
Glen Fandl, a tax consultant and real estate appraiser with experience evaluating complex industrial properties, to establish the
value of the land, buildings, improvements, and wharf. For every
aspect of the real property, except the STS cranes, “Fandl held an
active New York real estate appraisal license . . . .”302 When it became apparent that litigation was inevitable, Fandl obtained a
temporary Virginia real estate appraisal license, effective January
28, 2016 to January 27, 2017, then prepared a formal appraisal
report of the property’s value, which was based on his 2015 informal valuation.303 His final valuation report was completed in October 2016.304
At the time of trial, Fandl’s temporary appraisal license
lapsed.305 The City of Portsmouth objected to Fandl’s expert testimony because he lacked Virginia licensure at the time of trial.306
Initially, the trial court permitted Fandl to testify because the
court recognized Fandl as an expert.307 Fandl testified as to the real
property and its improvements, ultimately reaching his opinion
that the fair market value of the real property and improvements
was $163,017,000.308
VIG called Maarten Verheijen, “a broker specializing in buying
and selling container-handling equipment used by marine ports, to
testify regarding the value of the STS cranes and other port equipment.”309 Mr. Verheijen was recognized by the trial court as “an
expert in the field of valuing specialized marine terminal equipment, including STS cranes, rail-mounted gantries, and rubbertire gantries.”310 Verheijen’s valuation methodologies “considered
a variety of factors in assessing the value of the STS cranes, including market trends,” the impact of different country currencies,
“the cranes’ size and age, the cost of a new crane, modification
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 48, 834 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 48, 834 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 48, 834 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 48, 834 S.E.2d at 236.
See id. at 48, 834 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 48, 834 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 48, 834 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 48–49, 834 S.E.2d at 236–37.
Id. at 49, 834 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 49, 834 S.E.2d at 237.
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costs, and warranty costs.”311 Ultimately, Mr. Verheijen opined
that “the primary market for the STS cranes would be overseas.”312
“Consequently, the valuation would have to account for transportation costs and electrical conversion costs because North America
uses an electrical system incompatible with any other location in
the world.” He valued the STS cranes at $34,200,000.313
The testimony of both experts presented by VIG for all of the
property was “$197,217,000—a figure $163,867,820 lower than the
City’s assessment.”314 Verheijen valued the other personal property at issue (the two types of gantry cranes) at a fair market value
of $19,500,000 for 2015 and $16,500,000 for 2016.315
“The trial court dismissed VIG’s real estate case because it reversed its prior decision to qualify Fandl as an expert.”316 While
again stating Fandl was “eminently qualified to testify” as an expert, the trial court found it was an abuse of its power to recognize
Mr. Fandl as an expert in Virginia real estate values—his appraisal work was unlicensed and he gave his testimony when he
was unlicensed in Virginia.317 The trial court concluded that crediting Fandl’s testimony would in effect be facilitating the commission of a criminal act, since developing an opinion of value of Virginia real estate without holding a license would constitute illegal
conduct and put the trial court in the position of condoning and
allowing unlawful activity.318
The Portsmouth City Circuit Court also rejected VIG’s personal
property tax case, primarily because Mr. Verheijen’s appraisals included transportation-related costs.319 “[C]osts of removal are not
part of Virginia’s definition of fair market value and their inclusion
rendered Verheijen’s testimony ‘flawed.’”320 The transportation
costs were “too speculative to be considered a special factor in valuing’ the gantries.”321 The trial court determined “VIG failed to

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 50, 834 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 50, 834 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 50, 834 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 50, 834 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 50–51, 834 S.E.2d at 238.
Id. at 51–52, 834 S.E.2d at 238.
Id. at 51–52, 834 S.E.2d at 238.
Id. at 52, 834 S.E.2d at 238.
Id. at 52, 834 S.E.2d at 238.
Id. at 52, 834 S.E.2d at 239.
Id. at 52, 834 S.E.2d at 238–39.
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carry its burden of establishing that the City overvalued the personal property.”322
VIG appealed both the holding that an appraiser of real property
must have an active Virginia appraisal license to testify as an expert, and that VIG failed to rebut the presumption that the City’s
assessments were correct.323
a. Licensure and Qualification of Real Estate Appraisal Expert
Virginia Code section 54.1-2011(A) provides that it is “unlawful
to engage in the appraisal of real estate or real property for compensation or valuable consideration in [Virginia] without first obtaining a real estate appraiser’s license.”324 The Supreme Court of
Virginia went at length through the development of the state’s
statutory scheme and precedents relating to unlicensed appraisal
testimony.325 The court noted that the Virginia General Assembly
in 1995 amended Virginia Code section 54.1-2010(B) to provide
that “[n]othing contained herein shall proscribe the powers of a
judge to determine who may qualify as an expert witness to testify
in any legal proceeding. This provision is declarative of existing
law.”326
However, the case of Lee Gardens Arlington Ltd. Partnership v.
Arlington County Board, decided several months after the July 1,
1995 effective date of the amendment to section 54.1-2010(B), overlooked the amendment, leading to the misstatement of Virginia’s
statutory law at the time it was decided.327
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Virginia International Gateway, Inc., noted that licensure status is not irrelevant, “remain[ing] an important consideration in assessing a prospective
expert’s qualifications.”328 However, the Virginia Code stands for
the proposition that “a trial court cannot refuse to qualify an otherwise appropriate expert solely for the lack of an active Virginia

322. Id. at 52, 834 S.E.2d at 238–39.
323. Id. at 52, 834 S.E.2d at 239.
324. Id. at 53, 834 S.E.2d at 239.
325. Id. at 53–56, 834 S.E.2d at 239–41.
326. Id. at 54, 834 S.E.2d at 239–40.
327. Id. at 54–55, 834 S.E.2d at 240 (citing Lee Gardens Arlington Ltd. P’ship v. Arlington Cty. Bd., 250 Va. 534, 463 S.E.2d 646 (1995)).
328. Id. at 57, 834 S.E.2d at 241.
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license at trial.”329 The supreme court found the trial court’s exclusion of Mr. Fandl’s testimony was an abuse of discretion, reversing
and remanding the real property tax case.330 However, the court
affirmed the trial court’s decision on the personal property case,
holding it did not err in ruling that VIG failed to overcome the presumption of the personal property assessment’s correctness.331
3. Another Taxpayer is Unable to Overcome Presumption of
Correctness in Challenge to Its Real Property Tax
Assessments—Portsmouth 2175 Elmhurst, L.L.C. v. City of
Portsmouth
In this case, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial
court did not err in upholding the City of Portsmouth’s tax assessments because the taxpayer did not overcome the presumption of
correctness attached to the mass appraisal and failed to show that
the City’s mass appraisal, or the subsequent 2015 revised assessment, violated professional appraisal procedures and standards.332
In Portsmouth 2175 Elmhurst, L.L.C. v. City of Portsmouth, the
taxpayer (“Portsmouth 2175 Elmhurst”), purchased a former
Smithfield Foods property consisting of approximately 12.5 acres
and a 141,229 square foot building located in the City of Portsmouth for $875,000 in 2013.333 Two years later, Portsmouth 2175
Elmhurst sold the property for $575,000.334 The building had been
vacant since 2012 when Smithfield Foods ceased operations in the
plant.335 For two of the three tax years at issue, the City assessed
the property at $6,132,520 per year.336 However, following an administrative challenge before the City’s Board of Equalization, the
2015 tax assessment was reduced to $3,768,160.337 Portsmouth
2175 Elmhurst paid a total of $233,540.31 in taxes, storm water
fees, penalties, interest, and attorney’s fees of $36,477.34.338

329. Id. at 57, 834 S.E.2d at 241.
330. Id. at 58, 62, 834 S.E.2d at 242, 244.
331. Id. at 62, 834 S.E.2d at 244.
332. Portsmouth 2175 Elmhurst, L.L.C. v. City of Portsmouth, 298 Va. 310, 320–25, 333,
837 S.E.2d 504, 508–11, 514–15 (2020).
333. Id. at 316, 837 S.E.2d at 506.
334. Id. at 316, 837 S.E.2d at 506.
335. Id. at 316, 837 S.E.2d at 506.
336. Id. at 316, 837 S.E.2d at 506
337. Id. at 316–18, 837 S.E.2d at 506–07.
338. Id. at 316, 837 S.E.2d at 506.
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At trial, Portsmouth 2175 Elmhurst presented a prima facie case
that the real property and former meat packing plant was valued
in excess of fair market value in determining whether mass appraisal for real estate tax assessment conformed to generally accepted appraisal practices, procedures, rules, and standards or applicable Virginia law relating to valuation of property.339
Portsmouth 2175 Elmhurst presented testimony of a highly qualified expert to that effect, an exhaustive appraisal report, and evidence that the property had sold recently on two occasions, each
time well below the City’s assessed value.340 Additional evidence at
trial showed the most recent purchaser demolished the building on
the property, which the court noted was compelling evidence that
“the building had outlived its useful life . . . .”341
The trial court issued a detailed memorandum opinion that upheld the City’s assessments.342 The court concluded that the property was assessed using proper techniques of mass appraisal based
on the cost method approach to valuation.343 The trial court wrote
that while the taxpayer’s testimony and experts’ opinions were in
conflict with those of the City, at no point did the City violate any
generally accepted appraisal practices, standards, rules, or Virginia laws.344
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that Virginia
Code section 58.1-3984(B) establishes the method for challenging
real property assessments.345 This provision establishes a presumption of correctness in favor of the locality.346 While establishing that the fair market value of the property is in excess of the
assessment is one-half of the statutory showing required, a taxpayer still has the burden to establish the second element of section 58.1-3984(B), that the assessment “was not arrived at in accordance with generally accepted appraisal practices, procedures,
rules, and standards . . . and applicable Virginia law relating to
valuation of property.”347 The supreme court noted that none of the
339. Id. at 324–25, 837 S.E.2d at 510–11.
340. Id. at 316, 324–25, 837 S.E.2d at 506, 510–11.
341. Id. at 316, 325, 837 S.E.2d at 506, 511.
342. Id. at 320, 837 S.E.2d at 508.
343. Id. at 320, 837 S.E.2d at 508.
344. Id. at 320, 837 S.E.2d at 508.
345. Id. at 320, 837 S.E.2d at 508.
346. Id. at 320, 837 S.E.2d at 508 (first citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3833(A)(1) (Cum.
Supp. 2019); and then citing id. § 58.1-3840 (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
347. Id. at 320–21, 837 S.E.2d at 508 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984(B) (Repl. Vol.
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live testimony presented at trial explained how the mass appraisal
“was not arrived at in accordance with generally accepted appraisal practices.”348 While criticisms were made by the taxpayer’s
appraisers regarding alleged specific violations of the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, none of these criticisms addressed what they believed to be flawed mass appraisal
method violations.349 Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the
trial court’s decision and held it did not err in holding that Portsmouth 2175 Elmhurst did not meet its burden of overcoming the
presumption of correctness attached to the mass appraisal.350
4. City of Richmond Misinterpreted Tax Amnesty Ordinance to
Wrongfully Deny Property Owner Tax Exemption Credit
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed two decisions by the
Richmond City Circuit Court to grant the City of Richmond’s (the
“City”) “motions to dismiss [the landowner’s] application for correction of erroneous assessment and complaint for declaratory judgment,” both dismissals relating to an interpretation of the City’s
tax amnesty ordinance.351 HRIP Miller & Rhoads Acquisition,
L.L.C. (“HRIP”) owns a building located in the City.352 “The City
levies taxes on real estate annually on January 1.”353 Richmond
City Code section 26-361(a) allows taxpayers to divide their real
estate taxes into two installments, with the first payment due by
January 14 and the second payment due by June 14.354
In 2017, HRIP was entitled to a tax exemption of “$524,584.43
under the City’s Tax Abatement for Rehabilitated Real Estate Program.”355 “HRIP applied half of the tax exemption to the amount of
real estate taxes it owed and timely paid the January 14th installment.”356 “The remaining installment, due on or before June 14th,

2017)).
348. Id. at 328, 837 S.E.2d at 512 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3984(B) (Repl. Vol.
2017)).
349. Id. at 328–31, 837 S.E.2d at 512–14.
350. Id. at 330–31, 837 S.E.2d at 514.
351. HRIP Miller & Rhoads Acquisition L.L.C. v. City of Richmond, No. 190316, 2020
Va. LEXIS 6, at *1, *4 (Apr. 9, 2020) (Richmond City).
352. Id. at *1.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at *1–2.
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was $72,580.50. HRIP failed to timely pay its second installment.”357 The City claimed that “HRIP’s failure to timely pay its
June 14th installment forfeited the entire 2017 tax exemption
credit of $524,584.43, including the portion already applied to the
January 14th installment.”358 HRIP then paid under protest all
taxes, penalties, and interest it owed to the City.359
HRIP applied for relief under Richmond’s tax amnesty ordinance, City Code section 26-29, which was adopted in April 2017.360
The City found that “HRIP did not qualify for amnesty because the
June 14th installment payment was not due prior to February 1st
and was, therefore, not delinquent as of February 1st as required
by the tax amnesty ordinance.”361 HRIP initiated two “companion
cases in the circuit court for an application for correction of erroneous assessments and a complaint for declaratory judgment. . . . The
circuit court consolidated the cases . . . .”362
The circuit court held that “(1) HRIP forfeited the entire exemption for the 2017 tax year by failing to pay its real estate taxes by
June 30” as required under City Code section 26-405(c); (2) the
City’s tax amnesty program under City Code section 26-29 “did not
provide tax amnesty for the untimely June installment;” and “(3)
that the City appropriately limited the application of the Tax Amnesty Program . . . .”363
The Supreme Court of Virginia noted on HRIP’s appeal that City
Code section 26-361(a) states that “[t]axes levied on real estate
shall be due and payable on the first day of the tax year.”364 The
court also pointed out that City Code section 26-29(b) establishes
the amnesty program dates “for delinquent local taxes . . . owed as
of February 1, 2017.”365 On appeal, the City argued there was no
error by the court below because “the words ‘delinquent’ and ‘owed’
are both modified by ‘as of February 1, 2017.’”366 HRIP, however,
contended that “‘as of February 1, 2017’ only modifies the word

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4–5 (quoting RICHMOND CITY, VA., CODE § 20-361(a) (2020)).
Id. at *5 (quoting RICHMOND CITY, VA., CODE § 26-29(b) (2020)).
Id.
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‘owed’” and that the circuit court’s “construction of the statute contravenes the rule of the last antecedent.”367 The Supreme Court of
Virginia stated, “[u]nder [the] rule, referential and qualifying
words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer
solely to the last antecedent. The last antecedent is the last word,
phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence.”368
The supreme court noted it could find “no evidence of a ‘contrary
intention’ in the wording of the [tax amnesty] ordinance that would
make this rule inapplicable.”369 “Because the phrase ‘as of February 1, 2017’ does not modify ‘delinquent,’ real estate taxes need not
be delinquent as of that date to be eligible for tax amnesty under
City Code [section] 26-29(b).”370 In this case, “HRIP’s June 14th installment was owed as of February 1st as taxes are levied and ‘due
and payable’ on January 1st” under City Code section 26-361(a).
“However, the installment was not delinquent until June 15,
2017.”371 The supreme court held the “circuit court erred in finding
that the 2017 tax amnesty program under City Code § 26-29(b)
only applied to real estate taxes that were both ‘owed’ and ‘delinquent’ as of February 1, 2017.”372 The court reversed the circuit
court’s decisions to grant the two motions to dismiss and remanded
the cases for further proceedings.373
C. Significant Attorney General Opinion—An Institution of
Higher Learning Exempt from Property Tax by Classification
Loses Its Tax Exemption When Its Property Is Conveyed to a
Single Member Limited Liability Company
The Attorney General of Virginia was asked to render a formal
opinion to the Commissioner of the Revenue of Virginia Beach on
the issue of whether property owned by a single member limited
liability company (“SMLLC”) is eligible for tax exemption by classification pursuant to Virginia Code section 58.1-3606(A)(4) “if the
sole owner of the SMLLC is a non-profit corporation that operates
367. Id. (citing Va. Educ. Ass’n v. Davison, 294 Va. 109, 120, 803 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2017)).
368. Id. at *5–6 (quoting Butler v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 291 Va. 32, 37, 780 S.E.2d 277,
280 (2015)).
369. Id. at *6.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at *6–7.
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as an institution of learning.”374 The Virginia Beach Commissioner
of the Revenue also asked whether “the receipts of the same
SMLLC could be excluded from business, professional, and occupational license (BPOL) taxes pursuant to [Virginia Code section]
58.1-3703(C)(18).”375
Pursuant to Virginia Code section 58.1-3606, “property owned
by ‘incorporated colleges or other institutions of learning not conducted for profit’ and used primarily for ‘literary, scientific or educational purposes or purposes incidental thereto’ generally is exempt from state and local taxation.”376 “Under Virginia law, a
limited liability company (LLC) is a legal entity separate and distinct from its members.”377 The LLC “has the power to own property, and title to any property acquired in the name of the LLC
vests in the LLC.”378 “This separate legal status exists even if there
is only a single member of the LLC.”379 Accordingly, “title to property vested in an SMLLC is not owned by its member.”380 The Attorney General of Virginia opined
that property that is owned by an SMLLC that does not independently
qualify as an “institution of learning not conducted for profit” is not
eligible for the tax exemption by classification under [Virginia Code]
section 58.1-3606(A)(4), notwithstanding that the sole owner of the
SMLLC is a non-profit corporation operating as an institution of
learning.381

The second issue raised by the Virginia Beach Commissioner of
the Revenue involved application of the BPOL exclusion from tax
provided to certain nonprofit organizations by Virginia Code section 58.1-3703(C)(18).382 The Attorney General of Virginia stated
that
[u]nless the SMLLC itself qualifies as one of the types of “nonprofit
organizations” [set out in Virginia Code section 58.1-3703(C)(18)], a

374. 2019 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 67.
375. Id.
376. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3606(A)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2017)).
377. Id. at 67–68 (citing Hagan v. Adams Prop. Assocs., 253 Va. 217, 220, 482 S.E.2d
805, 807 (1997); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 270, 274, 549 S.E.2d 621, 622–23
(2001)).
378. Id. at 68 (citing VA. CODE ANN §§ 13.1-1009, -1021 (Repl. Vol. 2016)).
379. Id. (citing Jeb Stuart Auction Servs., L.L.C. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 3d 479,
484 (W.D. Va. 2015)).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
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determination must be made as to whether all or a portion of its receipts, including gifts and contributions, are excluded from BPOL taxation by virtue of its relationship to its member.383

“Under federal and Virginia income tax laws, the income of a
domestic SMLLC may be considered the same as the income of
[the] owner.”384 “By default, domestic SMLLCs are characterized
as ‘disregarded entities’ for federal income tax purposes.”385 The
IRS notes such contributions made to a domestic SMLLC “will be
treated as charitable contributions to the charitable organization.”386 The Attorney General stated that “[a]pplying a similar rationale to the BPOL tax exclusions, the receipts of a disregarded
SMLLC should be treated as the receipts of its sole member and
are excluded from BPOL tax to the extent permitted by [Virginia
Code section] 58.1-3703(C)(18).”387
The Attorney General concluded by stating that whether and to
what extent the receipts of a member organization qualify for exclusion from BPOL taxation under Virginia Code section 58.13703(C)(18) are determinations to be made by the Virginia Beach
Commissioner of the Revenue.388
CONCLUSION
The 2020 session of the Virginia General Assembly reverted
back to its recent trend of addressing mostly targeted and technical
changes in the tax laws, with several important exceptions. First,
the new statutes providing procedures for reporting federal adjustments to partnership taxable income is very important to implement Virginia’s legislative response to an entirely new federal statutory scheme to audit and assess taxes, penalties, and interest at
the federal level. Without the Virginia General Assembly’s adoption of new rules, the Department of Taxation would be significantly handicapped in its ability to identify, quantify, assess, and

383. Id. at 69.
384. Id. (citing Nahigian v. Juno-Loudoun, L.L.C., 677 F.3d 579, 591 n.8 (4th Cir. 2012)).
385. Id. (citing 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2, -3 (2019)).
386. Id. at 69–70.
387. Id. at 70. Note the Attorney General of Virginia stated, “[t]his would not be the case
if the SMLLC elects to be classified as a corporation for federal income tax purposes or if
the SMLLC does not meet the requirements set out in Internal Revenue Service Notice
2012-52, 2012-35 I.R.B. 317.” Id. at 70 n.14.
388. Id. at 71.
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collect income tax due following federal income tax audit adjustments to income tax returns of partnerships. Also important are
the number of new local tax provisions and credits to encourage
investment and expansion of renewable energy sources from solar
energy projects, as well as encouraging compliance with pollution
control property tax exemptions.
The more dramatic taxation impacts, however, are from the continued and increased volume of judicial cases involving Virginia
local taxes. Real property tax continues to be an area of dispute
between landowners and local taxing jurisdictions. The 2012
amendments to Virginia Code section 58.1-3984(B) are finally receiving some consistent treatment by the courts as the Supreme
Court of Virginia continues to weigh in and provide much needed
guidance on what burdens a taxpayer must overcome to put forward a credible case when challenging a real property tax assessment. The McKee, Virginia International Gateway, and Portsmouth 2175 Elmhurst decisions of the supreme court provide
significant and useful guidance that counsel for taxpayers need to
understand before initiating a judicial challenge to a real property
tax assessment. The taxpayer’s counsel needs to conduct a fair
amount of due diligence, fact finding, and analysis before filing his
or her application to correct an erroneous tax assessment with the
courts. The days of simply asserting that an assessment exceeds a
property’s fair market value to be successful in litigation are over.
We believe that we will see more real property tax cases filed, as
well as an increase in attention to business tangible personal property, and machinery and tools tax cases.

